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The Economic and Environmental Impact of a Carbon Tax for Scotland: 
A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a disaggregated energy-economy-environmental model, we investigate the economic and 
environmental impact of a Scottish specific carbon tax under three alternative assumptions about the 
use of the revenue raised by the tax: revenues raised are not recycled within Scotland; revenues are 
used to increase general government expenditure or to reduce Scottish income tax. We find that by 
imposing a tax of £50 per ton of CO2 the 37% CO2 reduction target is met with a very rapid 
adjustment in all three cases if the model incorporates forward-looking behavior. However, the 
adjustment is much slower if agents are myopic. In addition, the results of the model suggest that a 
carbon tax might simultaneously stimulate economic activity while reducing emissions and thus 
secure a double dividend, but only for the case in which the revenue is recycled through income tax. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Carbon Tax, CGE Modelling, Double Dividend, Regional Economics 
JEL: C68, Q51, Q58
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1. Introduction 
Since devolution, the Scottish Government has increasingly adopted a distinctive environmental and 
energy policy (Allan et al., 2008). The Climate Change (Scotland) Act includes a target to reduce 
CO2 emissions to 42% below 1990 levels by 2020. This is stricter than the 34% CO2 emissions 
reduction adopted by the UK Government. Moreover, the corresponding Scottish Government target 
for renewable electricity generation in 2020 is equivalent to 100% of electricity consumption in 
Scotland and preliminary data suggest that the interim 2011 target of 31% was exceeded by 4 
percentage points. 
 
However, earlier discussions have established that whilst Scotland has adopted challenging targets, 
many key policy instruments are reserved to the UK government (Allan et al., 2008; McGregor et al., 
$WSUHVHQWWKHPDLQ´JUHHQµHOHPHQWVRI WKHWD[V\VWHPUHPDLQXQGHU:HVWPLQVWHUFRQWURO
This includes fuel duties, air passenger duty and the climate change levy. Also reserved to the UK 
Government are: the tax-transfer system; powers over the structure and regulation of the electricity 
market; Renewable Obligations Certificates, the Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation and the 
Renewable Heat Incentive; Climate Change Agreements; and the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
 
The Scottish Government has succeeded in making Scottish energy policy more distinctive, first 
through setting different targets (as described above) and second by developing specific policies 
within the non-reserved powers at their discretion. These powers include the judicious use of the 
planning system and additional funding for alternative renewable technologies in pre-commercial 
scales, such as the Wave and Tidal Energy Scheme (WATES), The Saltire Prize, and the Scottish 
Community and Households Renewables Initiative. Nevertheless, the Committee on Climate Change 
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report into Scottish emissions targets concluded that with current policies, and assuming the current 
FDSRQHPLVVLRQVXQGHU WKH(8(76 WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW·V WDUJHWRI DUHGXFWLRQZLOO EH
missed, with emissions only falling by 38% on 1990 levels. 
 
Economists typically regard a carbon tax as the most efficient way to reduce carbon emissions 
(Tullock, 1967; Pearce, 1991). Furthermore, continuing pressure for greater fiscal autonomy is likely 
to expand the range of climate change policies that the Scottish Government has at its disposal 
(McGregor and Swales, 2013). It is therefore of interest to consider the effect of a Scottish specific 
carbon tax. This is particularly relevant given the more demanding environmental targets set by the 
Scottish Government and the present discussions around increased fiscal autonomy for Scotland. The 
Scotland Act (2012) has augmented the income tax raising power of the Scottish Parliament, so that it 
will have the power to make a balanced-budget adjustment in public expenditure funded by 
corresponding changes in the basic as well as higher rates of income tax of up to 10p in the pound1.  
 
In this paper we employ an empirical energy-economy-environmental model2 of Scotland to simulate 
the impact of a Scottish specific carbon tax on the levels of carbon emissions and of aggregate and 
sectoral economic activity. The simulations are conducted under alternative assumptions about the 
use of the revenues raised by the tax, for example, to increase general Government expenditure or to 
reduce the rate of income tax. 
 
                                                 
1 Originally the Scottish Parliament had the authority to change only the basic rate of income tax up to 3p in the pound. 
 
2 Several works analyses the macroeconomic impact of introducing a carbon tax using macroeconomic modeling: See e.g., 
Symons et al (1994) for UK, Wissema and Delling (2007), for Ireland, Bovenberg and Goulder, (1996) and Goulder, 
(1995) for US and Cornwall and Creedy (1996) and Adams and Parameter (2013) for Australia.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the arguments for a carbon tax 
and introduces the notion of the double dividend. Section 3 summarises the key features of the 
model. Section 4 briefly describes the model parameterization and discusses the simulation set up. 
Section 5 discusses the simulation results. In Section 6 we provide a sensitivity analysis and in Section 
7 we present brief conclusions.  
 
2. The case for a carbon tax 
 
Firms, households and governments generate emissions of CO2 that impose a cost on present and 
future generations in the form of global climate change.3  However, those directly emitting CO2 do 
not directly bear the cost of their own emissions. That is to say, they are not forced specifically to 
take these costs into account when they make production and consumption decisions. These costs are 
NQRZQJHQHULFDOO\DVH[WHUQDOLWLHVDQGWKHQRWLRQWKDWWKH\FDQEH LQWHUQDOLVHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWV·
setting a tax equal to the marginal cost imposed on others was first suggested by Pigou (1920). Coase 
(1960) persuasively argues that imposing appropriate property rights can also solve this problem. In 
this case, the owners of the right to pollute the atmosphere would charge for allowing individuals and 
organisations to emit CO2. This is the basis for the use of tradable permits for controlling emissions
4. 
However, the fundamental principle behind carbon taxes and carbon trading is the same5. A price 
                                                 
3  We do not question the science here. For a robust rebuttal of the climate change sceptics, see Nordhaus (2012). 
 
4
 Adams and Parmenter (2013) using a single-country multiregional CGE model of Australia interfaced with a multi-
country global economic model such as GTEM (Pant, 2007) evaluate the impact  of a global emissions trading scheme. 
 
5 Weitzman (1974) discusses the cases where these approaches differ under uncertainty. 
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should be set for emitting carbon, either through a specific tax or the requirement to acquire a 
permit. 
 
Essentially, the arguments that favour treating externalities in this way, are similar to those that 
favour the use of free markets in general. It is an effective means of decentralised decision making. In 
this specific case, the government has set targets for the level of carbon emissions. However, this 
decentralised approach should lead to these targets being met at minimum cost in terms of 
consumption foregone. Setting a price on carbon emissions generates an appropriate set of incentives. 
For instance, firms will seek to adopt less emissions-intensive production techniques. Given that the 
price of products that embody carbon emissions will rise, consumers will tend to consume less of 
these products. Further there is an increased incentive for technical change that involves reducing 
carbon emissions in the future (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Goulder and Mathai, 2000).  
 
There is an additional potential benefit from the use of carbon taxes. Carbon taxes (or tradeable 
permits, if owned by the state) are sources of revenue for the government6. This additional revenue 
can be used to reduce other taxes that generate distortions in the operation of the economy, thereby 
producing a so-callHG ¶GRXEOH GLYLGHQG· +HUH QRW RQO\ DUH &22 emissions reduced (the first 
dividend), but the efficiency with which other elements of the economy operate can be 
simultaneously improved (the second dividend) generating a decrease in the unemployment rate, 
increase in employment rate and in GDP.  In the literature, there is extensive discussion concerning 
                                                 
6 A key role of the government is to produce public goods: goods that provide freely available services where it is difficult 
to exclude individuals from benefiting from these services. These goods are provided inadequately by the private market. 
The classic example is defence. 
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the possible nature of this second dividend and the circumstances under which it exists7.  Using 
applied general equilibrium models, Bor and Huang (2010), Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1998), 
Glomm et al. (2008), Goulder (1995), Manresa and Sancho (2005), Hoel and Schneider (1997), all 
find evidence of the existence of the second dividend and in some cases even a triple dividend, which 
is associated with a decrease in poverty (Van Heerden et al. 2006). 
 
3. The AMOSENVI model of Scotland 
 
3.1. General model features  
AMOSENVI is a large scale, multi-sectoral energy-economy-environment computable general 
equilibrium model for Scotland. The model has seventeen industry sectors8 of which thirteen are 
energy sectors. Among energy sectors we identify nine electricity generation sectors. Production 
inputs include primary factors (labour and capital) and intermediate purchases. The model includes 
three domestic institutional sectors: Firms, Households and Government. 
 
External institutions are split into the Rest of UK (RUK) and Rest of the World (ROW). We adopt 
assumptions typically used for a small open economy. In particular the region is too small to affect 
prices in international and interregional markets so that the RUK and ROW prices are taken to be 
exogenous9. 
                                                 
7 See Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Fullerton and Metcalf (1998) for a clear account of the issues and 
Bosquet (2000) for a survey of the double dividend literature on environmental taxes. 
 
8 See Table A1 in the Appendix for details about sectoral aggregation. 
9
 AMOSENVI is a single country model where the RUK and the ROW are exogenous in the model therefore we are not 
able to capture the spillover coming from the RUK or the ROW. This seems is a reasonable first approximation given that 
the Scottish economy is less than 9% of the UK economy on any measure of scale.   
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The model can be solved with either myopic or forward-looking expectations. In the former case 
agents have adaptive expectations so that they abstract from future periods, while in the latter case 
firms and consumers have perfect foresight and react to anticipated future events. Except where 
explicitly stated the model is run here under perfect foresight.  
3.2. Production structure 
Production is characterized by cost minimization with standard, well-behaved production functions. 
The production structure of the model is represented by a multi-level constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function as is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the 
structure of the Electricity supply sector while Figure 2 is a schematic of the structure of production 
for all the other sectors of the economy.  
 
For all sectors, value added and intermediate inputs combine to produce total gross output. Value 
added is obtained by combining capital and labour. Intermediate inputs are decomposed into energy 
and non-energy inputs. Then energy is split in Electricity and non-Electricity. The latter is divided 
between Oil and Non-Oil then Non-Oil is further disaggregated between Gas and Coal. 
 
In the electricity sector we distinguish between Transmission and Generation, where the latter is in 
turn a combination of intermittent and non-intermittent electricity generation. The intermittent 
sectors are Marine and on- and off-shore Wind Generation. The non-intermittent composite is 
further split between Low Carbon and High Carbon electricity generation.  
 
Intermediate inputs (both energy and material) can be purchased locally or imported from the Rest of 
UK (RUK) and from the Rest of the World (ROW). Regional and imported goods are combined 
9 
 
through a CES function. This means that intermediate goods produced locally or imported are 
considered as imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1960). The demand function for regionally produced 
and imported intermediate inputs derives from the solution of a cost minimization problem.  
 
Each industry in the region produces goods and services that can be exported or sold in the regional 
market. An export demand function closes the model where the foreign demand for Scottish goods 
and services depends on the terms of trade effect and on the export price elasticity. 
 
3.3. Consumers 
The infinitely lived consumer chooses a sequence of consumption that maximizes the present value of 
utility, as summarized by the lifetime utility function which takes the following form: 
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where 
tC  is the consumption at time period ,t s and r  are respectively the constant elasticity of 
marginal utility and the constant rate of time preference. The dynamic budget constraint ensures that 
the discounted present value of consumption must not exceed total household wealth. Once the 
optimal path of consumption is obtained from the solution of the intertemporal problem, the 
aggregate consumption is allocated intra-temporally between commodities through a CES function. 
Household demand for regional and imported goods is the result of the intra-temporal cost 
minimization problem and, similarly to the production side, domestic and imported commodities are 
imperfect substitutes.  
 
3.4. Investment 
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We model the investment decision as in Hayashy (1982) where the rate of investment is a function of 
marginal q (or average q)10 which is the ratio of the value of firms (VF) to the replacement cost of 
capital (3NÃ.)7KXVWKHSDWKRILQYHVWPHQWLVREWDLQHGE\PD[LPL]LQJWKHSUHVHQWYDOXHRIWKHILUP·V
cash flow given by profit, ,tp  less private investment expenditure, It subject to the presence of 
adjustment cost  txg  where ttt KIx / : 
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The solution of the dynamic problem gives us the law of motion of the shadow price of capital, tO  and 
the time path of investment related to the tax-DGMXVWHG7RELQ·Vq (Tobin, 1969).  
 
Investment by sector of destination are transformed to investment by sector of origin through a 
capital matrix constructed using a simple cross entropy estimation. Capital goods can be purchased 
locally or imported. Imperfect substitution between locally and imported capital goods is introduced 
through a CES function. 
 
3.5 Labour market and migration 
The labour market is characterized by imperfect competition. Thus the wage rate is determined 
through a wage bargaining function or wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) according to 
which real wages and unemployment are negatively related:  
 
                                                 
10 As we are assuming that the firm is price taker, marginal q is equal to average q. For further details see Hayashy (1982). 
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where: c is a calibrated parameter, w is the nominal wage, u is the unemployment rate and cpi is the 
consumer price index. The wage-unemployment elasticity is -0.113 (Layard et al., 1991). 
 
There is no change in natural population; however the labour force (LS) evolves over time through 
migration: 
 ttt mLSLS   11  (4) 
 
where m is net in-migration as a proportion of the regional population. In each period, migration is 
positively related to the gap between the log of regional and national (wN/cpiN) real wages, and 
negatively related to the gap between the log of national, (uN) and regional unemployment rates 
u where uN , wN and cpiN are are not time-varying: 
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Where 9  is a parameter calibrated in order to ensure zero net migration in the base year.  In 
equation (5) regional population adjusts according to the econometrically parameterised regional net 
migration function reported in Layard et al. (1991).The elasticities incorporated are -0.08 for the gap 
between the regional and national unemployment rate and 0.06 for the gap between the regional and 
national real wages.  
 
3.7 Government  
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Government expenditure comprises current spending on goods and services and transfers to 
households and firms. Its revenues are given by labour and capital income taxes, indirect taxes on 
production and an ad valorem tax on the use of fuels. When a balanced budget is applied either 
government consumption or the income tax rate are endogenous. 
 
3.8 Equilibrium  
The total absorption equation provides equilibrium in the commodity market. This is sufficient to 
guarantee equilibrium in the payments account since we are not considering money as a commodity. 
As for the capital market, capital demand equals the capital stock. In general, the labour market is 
equilibrated through endogenous changes in wage and unemployment rates.  
 
3.9. Myopic specification 
The myopic model developed here is similar in structure to the model described above. The 
differences are in consumption and investment. In each period, consumption is a linear function of 
real disposable income. Thus, contrary to the perfect foresight case, myopic consumers preserve the 
condition of stability between current consumption and wealth during the entire transitional path.    
 
As for investment, the adjustment rule introduced in the myopic model is consistent with the 
neoclassical formulation developed in Jorgenson (1963): investments are determined as a fraction of 
the gap between the desired and actual level of capital stocks adjusted for depreciation. This is also 
wholly compatible with the Uzawa (1969) formulation of adjustment costs where the investment 
capital ratio is determined by the rate of return to capital and the user cost of capital, allowing the 
capital stock to reach its desire level in a smooth fashion over time.  
13 
 
4. Dataset, parameterization and simulation strategy 
 
4.1 Database and parameterization 
The model is calibrated using a Scottish Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the year 200011. CO2 
emissions for Scotland are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. Emissions data together with the 
data on energy volume and related sectoral CO2 intensities are estimated in Turner (2002). 
 
Some of the elasticities of substitution and other behavioural parameters are based on econometric 
estimation or best guesses. For all sectors, trade elasticities are set equal to 2 (Gibson, 1990) whilst 
elasticities between labour and capital is equal to 0.3 (Harris, 1989). Between energy and non-
energy, electricity and non-electricity and between Oil and non-oil the elasticity is equal to 2; 
between transmission and generation the elasticity is set to 0.3. For all renewable electricity the 
elasticity of substitution equals 5.  
 
The interest rate (faced by producers, consumers and investors) is set to 0.04, the rate of depreciation 
to 0.15 and the constant elasticity of marginal utility equals to 1.2 (Evans, 2005).  
 
 4.2 Simulation set up 
The simulations impose a tax on carbon emissions generated in production. This is achieved by 
introducing an ad valorem tax on the use of the three domestic and imported fossil fuel energy sources 
- coal, oil and gas - in their use as intermediate inputs in the production of other Scottish goods and 
                                                 
11
 The model is calibrated using a relatively old database. However, given the level of aggregation across non-
energy sectors, it is reasonable to assume that the structure of the Scottish economy has remained 
comparatively stable.  
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services. The actual tax rate imposed is differentiated according to the carbon content of each fuel. 
The tax is imposed in the first period and maintained at a constant rate. The model is run forward 
with no other changes until a new steady-state equilibrium is attained. 
 
The tax generates revenue for the public sector. We run three simulations that differ in the way in 
which these funds are recycled. In one simulation the revenues revert to the UK Government and are 
spent outwith Scotland.12 In the other two simulations, the funds are used in Scotland. In one the 
revenues are recycled through an expansion in general government expenditure. In the other the 
revenues are used to reduce income tax.  
 
7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW·VWDUJHWLVWRUHGXFH&22 emissions by 42% in 2020, compared to the total 
in 1990. Our model is calibrated for the year 2000. Because there had already been some reduction in 
emissions in the decade leading up to 2000, to achieve the Scottish target requires a 37% reduction of 
CO2 emissions in the 20 years to 2020. By trial and error, simulation indicates that the target can be 
met by a carbon tax of £50 per tons of CO2. This can be seen in Figure 3 where we plot, for a range 
of possible tax rates, the associated reduction in total CO2 emissions.  On the vertical axis we show 
the carbon tax rate in pounds per ton while on the horizontal axis we plot the 2020 percentage 
reduction from base year values in total CO2 emissions. The relationship between tax rate and CO2 
reduction is shown for the two methods of recycling revenues within Scotland and for the external 
recycling case.  
                                                 
12
 It is not clear why a devolved Scottish Government would agree to such an arrangement, since this implies a Scottish-
specific fiscal contraction. The arrangement would be much more likely to apply in the case of a UK wide carbon tax 
imposed by Westminster. The case provides a useful benchmark, in which the revenues raised are not recycled at all 
within Scotland. 
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By imposing a tax of £50 per ton of CO2, the total tax-take corresponds, in our base year, to £1662 
million at 2000 prices. 
 
5. Simulation Results  
5.1 Economic impact 
Table 1 reports results for key economic variables for the three variations on the use of tax revenues. 
Results are expressed in terms of percentage changes from initial steady state equilibria and are 
presented for both the short- and long-runs. The short-run results give the impact in period one, 
during which both capital stocks and population are fixed at their base-year values. The long-run 
results apply when all capital stocks and the population have fully adjusted to the disturbance. 
 
In all three cases the introduction of the carbon tax leads to a substantial reduction in CO2 emissions. 
The 37% CO2 reduction target is met with a very rapid adjustment even in the first period. However, 
the impacts on the aggregate activity variables, GDP and total employment, are much smaller in the 
short run and their sign depends on how the tax revenues are recycled. In other CGE applications (see 
e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996) the first dividend is always easily met, regardless of the way in 
which the revenue is recycled. However, the impact on welfare and economic activity can change 
dramatically with the chosen method of recycling the additional revenue. 
 
Where the tax revenue is externally recycled the carbon tax clearly has a depressing effect on the 
Scottish economy. The cost of fossil fuels used in production increases thereby reducing the industrial 
demand for fuels. This generates an overall contractionary impact on production and final demand. 
GDP decreases by 0.30% in the short run and 2.68% in the long run. Employment initially falls by 
16 
 
more than GDP, as labour is more flexible than capital in the short run. Indeed, labour is mobile 
across sectors from the outset. The fall in labour demand causes a rise in the unemployment rate of 
4.1% in the short-run. However, the impact of outmigration, triggered by the adverse local labour 
market conditions, causes the unemployment and real wage rate return to their original levels in the 
long-run. In the long-run the labour force falls by 2.60%, just less than the fall in GDP. This also 
means that in the short-run the capital/labour ratio rises due to the absence of migration whereas 
after complete adjustment the capital/labour ratio falls. 
 
In the long run nominal wages increase by 0.81% from base year value as workers attempt to 
maintain their real wages. The replacement cost of capital rises by 0.63% depressing investment and 
thus capital stocks, which fall by 2.82%. The increase in prices produces negative competitiveness 
effects reducing exports by 1.23%.   
 
For the case where revenues are recycled through increased Government expenditure, the negative 
impact of a decrease in the use of energy is accompanied by a counterbalancing effect generated by the 
increase in Government expenditure. This latter effect operates as a demand side stimulus. The 
simulation results show a significant reduction in CO2 emissions, and a net effect on aggregate 
economic activity that is again contractionary.  
 
In this simulation there is an increase in public expenditure of 4.66% in the short-run and 3.97% in 
the long-run, funded by the additional carbon tax revenues. GDP, employment, capital stock and 
consumption fall in both time frames. The fall in activity is however less than the externally recycled 
scenario. The increase in public spending is only able partially to mitigate the adverse supply side 
17 
 
effects of the tax. The long-run effects on prices are the same as the externally recycled scenario (see 
e.g. wage and the replacement cost of capital in Table 1). This is what we would expect if the 
production factors are allowed to adjust fully in the long run given that the increase in government 
expenditure has only demand side effects13.  
 
In the model presented here we abstract from the potential supply-side effects that may arise from the 
increase in public expenditure (see e.g. Lecca et al., 2010, 2012). A different outcome would be 
possible if the increase in public expenditure was allocated to public investment, rather than current 
expenditure, which in turn would increase the stock of the public capital. Furthermore, we are not 
capturing any possible amenity effects of the increased government expenditure on WKH LQGLYLGXDO·V
decision to migrate. In the present application the potential migrant is indifferent between marginal 
changes in local public expenditure and private consumption. However, different results can arise if 
there is a positive marginal preference for local public expenditure (Lecca et al, 2010, 2012). 
 
A qualitatively different outcome for economy activity is obtained where the carbon tax revenues are 
used to reduce the average rate of personal income tax. The results shown in Table 1 indicate that, 
under the circumstances assumed in this simulation, the implementation of such a revenue-neutral set 
of tax changes not only reduces CO2 emissions, but also stimulates economic activity and jobs. In this 
case revenue recycling reduces the rate of income tax, which falls in both the short and the long run 
by 6.16% and 5.37% respectively. This would be within the range of income tax variation proposed 
in the Scotland Act (2012) which provides the Scottish Parliament with greater tax raising powers.  
 
                                                 
13 This would not be the case with fixed labour supply or with limited labour mobility. 
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The net impact on the Scottish economy is positive, resulting in an increase in GDP of 0.26% and 
0.83% in the short and long-run respectively. Employment and household consumption increase in 
both time periods.  
 
The short-run expansion in economic activity increases the demand for labour thereby reducing the 
unemployment rate in the short run by 3.77% from base year values and so increasing the real wage 
after tax by 0.43%.  The increase in the real wage stimulates household consumption which increases 
by 1.18% from base year values. In the short-run commodity prices have increased generating some 
crowding out of exports, which fall by 0.29%. 
 
The combined effect of a rise in the real wage after tax and the reduction in unemployment rate 
encourage in-migration. Simultaneously, in-migration puts downward pressure on the real wage 
during the transition path. The resulting in-migration increases labour supply, again pulling the real 
wage and the unemployment rate back to their base year value in the long-run  The long run fall in 
nominal wages is accompanied by an increase in labour supply and competitiveness with increased 
household consumption (1.45%) and exports (0.05%) drive the expansion in the economy.  
 
Furthermore, the increase in private capital stock puts downward pressure on the capital rental rate, 
producing a system wide efficiency stimulus lowering commodity prices, which in turn push the 
replacement cost of capital below its base year value. The real shadow price of capital increases, so 
WKDW 7RELQ·V q moves procyclically, ultimately encouraging additional investment and so capital 
stocks.  
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Employment increases by 0.42% in the short run and 1.06% in the long run. In this scenario the 
percentage change in employment is greater than the percentage change in GDP in both time frames 
shown here.  
 
In Figure 4 we report the short and the long-run changes in sectoral output where the revenue is 
recycled through reduced income taxes. Of course, the introduction of the carbon tax directly 
increases the price of coal, oil and gas when these are used as an input in production, so that the 
demand for these fuels falls, reducing dramatically their production and import levels. Electricity 
supply increases in the short run, as a result of the small increase in economic activity. However, in 
the long run, when there has been a full adjustment to the new prices, electricity supply falls. There 
is, however, a significant increase in electricity generated from renewable energy. The share of 
electricity generated by renewables as a share of electricity consumption in Scotland increases in the 
long run by slightly less than 20%, reflecting also the large fall in output in the coal and gas electricity 
generation sectors. As for the non-energy sectors, only the primary sector shows a long-run reduction 
in output.  
 
5.2 The impact on CO2 emissions 
 
In Figure 5, we show the period-by-period reduction in CO2 emissions from the base period. Note 
that for all three simulations the carbon tax is able to achieve the 37% target emissions reduction by 
the year 2020. This target is met after only 5 years when the revenue is either externally recycled or 
used to increase public expenditure within Scotland. With revenue recycling through a reduction in 
personal income tax, the target is achieved after ten years. 
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All the simulations reported up to now have incorporated forward-looking behavior on the part of all 
agents. In Figure 6 we compare the period-by-period impact of the carbon tax on the level of CO2 
emissions under both forward looking and myopic assumptions. Again we report the percentage 
change from base year values of total CO2 emissions for the simulations where the carbon tax revenue 
is used to reduce income tax. As we would intuitively expect, both the myopic and forward-looking 
model reach the same long-run equilibrium, regardless of agents· expectation formation process. 
(Lecca et al, 2013). However, whilst with perfect foresight the target is achieved in less than ten 
years, with the myopic model we are only able to reach the target by 2025.  
 
This has implications for the need for credibility in the implementation of the environmental policy by 
the Scottish Government. In order that agents can optimally adjust to policy by anticipating its future 
effects, those agents must believe that the policy will be maintained in the future. In the myopic case, 
the agents have adaptive expectations. They adjust only with respect to present prices and outputs. 
The adMXVWPHQW LVPXFKVORZHU LI WUDQVDFWRUVGRQRWEHOLHYH WKH*RYHUQPHQW·V commitment to the 
tax change and form their expectations accordingly.  
 
In Figure 7 we show the short-run and long-run change in CO2 emissions at the sectoral level. Note 
that there are huge reductions in emissions in all energy sectors. In the long run, emissions in the coal 
and the coal electricity generation sectors fall by 70% and 79% respectively. As for the non-energy 
sectors, the biggest reduction in emissions are in the manufacturing and the service sectors, which are 
the most energy-intensive sectors. 
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6. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section we evaluate the sensitivity of the results under the income tax recycling case for a range 
of parameter values reported in Table 2. Given that we introduce a tax on industrial consumption of 
fuels the results obtained so far can be sensitive to the values of the elasticities of substitution in the 
nested production structure as represented in Figure 1 and 2. In the first column of Table 2, we 
report the default values used in the analysis so far. In the second column we increase the elasticity of 
all renewable sectors while in the third column the only elasticity we change is that between 
electricity and non-electricity.  The simulations results obtained using these parameter values are 
reported in Figure 8 and 9 and for the case in which revenues are recycled through reduction in the 
labour income tax rate.  
 
In Scenario B for all rates of tax the reduction in CO2 emissions is lower than Scenario A and C as 
depicted in Figure 8. This is the result of a greater economic impact that occurs in this Scenario as 
shown in Figure 9. Both curves related to scenario B in Figure 8 and 9 are steeper than the other two 
cases. When the elasticity of substitution between electricity and non-electricity falls, the shift away 
from fossil fuels is reduced, limiting the negative adverse impact of an increase in taxation and so 
increasing the second dividend.  
 
For the case where we increase the elasticity of substitution among renewable sectors the reduction in 
emissions is greater for each simulated tax compare to the other two cases. Making the demand for 
renewable energy more elastic certainly increases the share of electricity generated by renewables, 
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however, it lowers the magnitude of the second dividend as we can see by the relationship between 
reduced CO2 and GDP shown in Figure 9. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
There is no doubt about the level of ambition of the Scottish *RYHUQPHQW·V HPLVVLRQV WDUJHWV but 
there must be some doubt about whether it has sufficient policy instruments under its direct control 
to induce households and firms to behave in a way that ensures these targets are met. Yet this is the 
challenge that the Scottish Government faces in the context of liberalized energy markets. While 
credibility is enhanced by enshrining emissions targets in a legal framework, this is generally 
insufficient to ensure their satisfaction (McGregor et al, 2012).  
 
The debate on constitutional change continues to gain momentum in the run up to the referendum on 
independence, scheduled for late 2014. However, regardless of the outcome, the Scottish 
Government is destined to benefit from a significant enhancement in the extent of its fiscal powers. 
Against this background, it seems natural to consider the possibility of a Scottish-specific carbon tax. 
It seems natural because this could be a genuine option under both devo- max and independence. 
6XFKDWD[LVIRFXVHGRQWKH´EDGµRIHPLVVLRQVGLUHFWO\DQG, if implemented in a fiscally neutral way, 
offers the potential of a double dividend if the revenues are used to subsidise, or reduce the level of 
existing taxes on, WKH´JRRGµRIHPSOR\PHQW2XUVLPXODWLRQVGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWDFDUERQWD[FRXOG
simultaneously stimulate employment while reducing emissions and secure a double dividend. 
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In our analysis we have shown that the imposition of a carbon tax generates adverse supply effects due 
to increase in prices when the revenue collected is recycled outwith the region. (In this case, the 
Scottish Government does not have control revenues and cannot recycle the revenue generated by the 
tax within the Scottish economy.) The negative economic effects on economic activity and 
employment are exacerbated by a fall in competitiveness so that demand for Scottish goods and 
services also fall. This also produces corresponding negative indirect effects on investment and 
household consumption. However, when the total tax revenue is recycled internally some offsetting 
effects occur. We consider two possible uses of the enhanced revenues: to stimulate an increase in 
current government expenditure, or to reduce the rate of income tax. In both cases the total tax-take 
is the same and it corresponds, in our base year, to £1662 million at 2000 prices. With revenue 
recycled through public expenditure, the positive expenditure stimulus is not able fully to offset the 
negative supply side effects of the increase in energy taxation. For the case in which the revenue is 
recycled through income tax there is a net positive impact on the economy. 
 
We plan more extensive systematic analysis of the factors that govern both the direction and the scale 
RIWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\·VUHVSRQVHWRDFDUERQWD[In particular, we shall investigate the impact of a 
Scottish carbon tax in circumstances where there are the supply-side effects of public expenditure. 
Furthermore, the likely impact on the Scottish economy and emissions of climate change policies 
pursued in the rest-of-the UK, the rest of the EU and the rest of the World is also potentially crucial 
(Adams and Parmenter, 2013). 
 
We conclude by noting that the estimates that we present here are by no means an upper bound for 
the potential beneficial impacts of a carbon tax: in the longer term, we would expect the tax to 
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stimulate innovation in low-carbon technologies, a positive effect that is absent from our current 
analysis. Furthermore, in current circumstances, it may be thought desirable to seek to focus the 
beneficial impacts more carefully, for example by recycling revenues to subsidise employment among 
the younger age groups who have been most adversely impacted by the recession and its aftermath. 
The results that we report here are sufficiently promising to merit more extensive analysis of the 
likely economic and environmental impacts of a Scottish carbon tax. 
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Table 1. Impact of implementing a £50 per tonne carbon tax in Scotland on key macro-
variables: Percentage change from base year values 
  
 
Externally Recycled 
Internally Recycled Internally Recycled 
    
Public Expenditure Income Tax 
  Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
CO2 Emissions -32.66 -39.34 -32.55 -38.84 -31.83 -37.49 
GDP -0.30 -2.68 -0.14 -1.37 0.26 0.83 
Unemployment Rate 4.08 0.00 1.79 0.00 -3.77 0.00 
Total Employment -0.45 -2.60 -0.20 -1.27 0.42 1.06 
Nominal Gross Wage -0.60 0.81 0.24 0.81 -0.88 -1.43 
Real Wage After Tax -0.45 0.00 -0.20 0.00 0.43 0.00 
Replacement Cost of Capital -0.26 0.63 0.50 0.63 0.07 -0.36 
Labour Supply 0.00 -2.60 0.00 -1.27 0.00 1.06 
Household Consumption -0.90 -1.68 -0.56 -0.87 1.18 1.45 
Govt. Consumption - - 4.66 3.97 - - 
Income Tax Rate - - - - -6.16 -5.37 
Capital Stock 0.00 -2.82 0.00 -1.53 0.00 0.40 
Export 0.14 -1.23 -0.55 -1.23 -0.29 0.05 
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Table 2 
Parameter Values 
Elasticities Default B C 
Intermediate-Value Added 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Energy and non-energy 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Electricity and non-electricity 2 2 0.3 
Oil and non-oil 2 2 2 
Transmission and generation 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Intermittent and non-intermittent 5 10 5 
Between non-intermittent 5 10 5 
Wind and marine 5 10 5 
On and off shore wind 5 10 5 
Between non-energy 0.3 0.3 0.3 
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Figure 1. Production structure - Electricity sector- 
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Figure 2. Production structure for all the other sectors 
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Figure 3. Reduction of CO2 emissions for a range of possible tax rate under three 
recycling methods 
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Figure 4. The short and long-run percentage change in sectoral output for a £50 per 
tonne tax on CO2 emissions with revenue recycling through a reduction in income tax    
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Figure 5. Change in total CO2 emissions for a £50 per tonne tax on carbon emissions for 
all three forms of revenue recycling 
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Figure 6. % reduction in total CO2 emissions for a £50 per tonne tax with revenue 
recycling through a reduction in income tax. A comparison between myopic and 
perfect foresight agents 
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Figure 7: The short and long-run % reductions in sectoral CO2 emissions for a £50 
tonne tax with revenue recycling through a reduction in income tax. 
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Figure 8. Reduction of CO2 emissions for a range of possible tax rate under different 
parameter values  
 
Figure 9. Change in GDP and Emissions under different parameterizations 
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Table A1 
Sectoral Breakdown 
Aggregated IO Sector 
Original 
Sector 
Number 
Included 
from 123 UK 
IO 
Primary  1-3+5-7 
Manufacturing  8-34+36-84 
Utilities and transport 87+88 93-97 87-88+93-97 
Services 89-92+98-123 
Coal (Extraction) 4 
Oil (refining and treatment of oil and 
petroleum products) and processing of 
nuclear fuel 
35 
Gas 86 
Electricity transmission, distribution and 
supply 
85 
Generation - Nuclear 85 
Generation - Coal 85 
Generation - Hydro 85 
Generation - Gas 85 
Generation - Biomass 85 
Generation - Wind IN SHORE 85 
Generation - Wind OFF SHORE 85 
Generation - Landfill gas 85 
Generation - Marine 85 
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Table A2 
Sectoral CO2 emissions linked to output and fuels use, 2000 (thousands tonnes of oil 
equivalent) 
  Output Coal Oil Gas Total 
Primary 429.00 57.26 955.75 20.74 1462.76 
Manufacturing 508.00 963.99 2020.09 2393.87 5885.95 
Utilities and transport 0.00 143.58 5238.47 757.44 6139.50 
Services 0.00 440.34 2168.18 837.89 3446.40 
Coal (Extraction) 0.00 189.03 71.62 1.29 261.93 
Oil  322.00 477.41 797.00 57.94 1654.35 
Gas 0.00 0.00 1.83 3326.05 3327.88 
Electricity transmission, distribution 
and supply 0.00 0.00 221.65 588.33 809.98 
Generation - Nuclear 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation - Coal 0.00 8262.26 0.00 307.12 8569.38 
Generation - Hydro 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation - Gas 0.00 0.00 4.37 2950.49 2954.86 
Generation - Biomass 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation - Wind IN SHORE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation - Wind OFF SHORE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation - Landfill gas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Generation - Marine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total sectoral emissions 1259.00 10533.87 11478.96 11241.16 34512.99 
Final demand - 184.60 8062.70 5749.37 13996.67 
Total emissions 1259.00 10718.47 19541.66 16990.53 48509.65 
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